Lennart Meri Lecture: Shall We Go Forward Together? Of Deals and Red Lines 

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Dear President Karis, 

Dear present and former presidents, prime ministers, ministers, and ambassadors (I think that covers the waterfront), 

Dear Kristi Raik, dear Helga Kalm, and especially dear Mart Meri, 

Ladies and gentlemen, dear friends,

it is an honor to be asked to give the Lennart Meri Lecture here in Tallinn! When I was asked to give this speech, I looked, as one does, to the conference’s “theme” page for guidance, to its emphasis on working with allies, and maintaining unity; and to its motto—Winston Churchill’s “We shall go forward together.”  

And as an old friend of this conference, of Estonia, and of America, it at once became clear to me that there would be an easy way of doing this unexpected assignment—and a somewhat harder way. Pointing at Russia’s brutal aggression against Ukraine does not require courage standing at this lectern. Exhorting the trans-Atlantic alliance to work together to help Ukraine win, and to enlist global partners: no persuasion needed in this town.  

But there is, of course, an elephant in your theme description, in this conference room, and in the trans-Atlantic alliance: the role of America under the second Trump administration. It is necessary to talk about that; indeed, I cannot honorably speak here and not do it. If some of you feel provoked by my remarks, I ask only that you hear me out. But know that I also intend to discuss what we in Europe need to do to navigate a period of exceptional danger to both Ukraine and the European project; where we should come to agreements with the Trump administration; and where we cannot. Hence my title: “Shall We Go Forward Together? Of Deals and Red Lines.” 

Last year, the alliance commemorated the 75^th anniversary of NATO—coincidentally, it was also the 20^th anniversary of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania joining NATO and the European Union. And last week, we celebrated the 80^th anniversary of the end of World War II, and the 75^th anniversary of the Schuman Plan, which planted the seeds for what later became the European Union. We look back on a miraculously long period of peace, prosperity, and democratic transformation in Europe—and one that we would never have achieved without the benevolent hegemony and the nuclear umbrella of the United States. But we celebrate these anniversaries in a dramatically darkened global strategic landscape.  

The balance of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine: hundreds of thousands dead and injured, millions of refugees, wanton and deliberate destruction, material damages in the billions—and a brutal aggressor who only wants to negotiate at the price of completely eradicating Ukrainian sovereignty. The same aggressor is waging an increasingly ruthless hybrid war within Europe to divide and politically paralyze us. Putin is not only targeting Ukraine but also aims to regain his old sphere of influence in Eastern Europe—and beyond. All of this with support from Iran, North Korea, and China.  

Beijing’s global dominance agenda has also long pursued strategic acquisitions of physical and digital infrastructure in Europe. There is hardly a hub or node of the European economy without Chinese components. Between “wolf warrior” diplomacy and the more recent charm offensives from Beijing, China has gone to considerable lengths to become a player in Europe. All while it is openly supporting Russia’s war in Ukraine. 

But what of America? Let me begin by spelling out a few points, so as to leave no room for misunderstandings. There can be no question that Americans are entitled to put “America First.” What they do in the privacy of their own constitutional order is none of our business. We have no right to demand a self-sacrificing stewardship of international order from the United States. Nor should other countries—including allies—expect free parking spots under the American security umbrella. We can certainly discuss whether our terms of trade are fair. We can have legitimate disagreements about what free speech means. Especially among allies.  

I don’t mind forgoing the shallow pieties, hypocrisies, whining, and festering co-dependencies that have long characterized the trans-Atlantic relationship for frank, blunt talk: I find that refreshing. Please accept the following in that spirit. 

Living in this moment often feels like being present at the destruction: not just of the world order shaped by the U.S. for so long, but of the idea of the West. Relationships and institutions are now at stake that we have considered imperishable since the mid-20^th century: the trans-Atlantic alliance, the European project, globalization, representative democracy. 

Nor is this some random, catastrophic cascade of events like the 2008 global financial crisis, or the pandemic of 2020-22. President Trump’s “America First” project is an intentional and strategic revision of the orders which have shaped much of our existence as individuals and nations in our lifetime: the global security and economic orders, our joint commitment to democracy and rule of law. All in the name of redressing “unfairness” and recovering American “dominance.” And all at the same time.  

I can hear you thinking: Didn’t Ukraine end up negotiating a much better minerals deal than we feared? Isn’t the U.S. still in NATO? Greenland is still an autonomous Danish territory, and Canada—well, Canada seems more Canadian than ever. Aren’t the tariffs currently suspended? And didn’t the vice president say he loved Europe—even Germany!—recently? And you are quite right, at least for now.  

But the fact remains that Trump’s “America First” project is a titanic attempt to revise the world in which we live in America’s favor—and with potentially harsh consequences for Europe. We are all long-standing friends of America here. But this America often feels less like Europe’s ally than an adversary. 

Three aspects of “America First” matter to Europe: security, geoeconomics, and democracy (not yours, ours). 

Security Policy 

Let me begin with Ukraine: I believe the president when he says that he wants the killing to end. The fact that the Trump administration has been willing to negotiate with Russia is something we should appreciate, much as its unnecessary concessions and solo conversations have raised eyebrows in Europe. Insisting, as the president has done, that a ceasefire must precede peace negotiations was important; we note that the White House is now irritated with the Kremlin, and willing to contemplate sanctions. The president has indicated that he would meet with Putin for direct discussions. That is good. 

But as we learned this week once more, the Kremlin is sticking to its maximalist position. Its demands include, as before: a ban on NATO membership for Ukraine; recognition of Russia’s annexation of four southeastern regions; and an end to Western military support for Kyiv. A return to the Istanbul format of 2022 would also mean Ukraine having to pledge neutrality and accept caps on its military. Finally, Putin still wants negotiations over the “causes of the conflict”—code for rolling back NATO enlargement and the U.S. presence in Europe. And as before, Russian missiles and bombs rain on Ukraine every day; there is talk of a summer offensive. Meanwhile, the German authorities have just arrested three “Ukrainians” which they say were hired by the GRU to commit acts of sabotage in Europe. In other words: Putin is simulating diplomacy while continuing to wage war. And not just in Ukraine.  

As for NATO, it has come as a relief that the U.S. has not left the alliance, and that Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance reportedly confirmed a continued American commitment to extended nuclear deterrence. Floating speculation about the withdrawal of SACEUR, whose role is linked to nuclear deterrence, was less useful. Casual dinner table conversation in DC about stationing tactical nuclear weapons in the Baltics: surely unhelpful. 

But then there is the new “Great Game” in the American hemisphere and the Arctic. Trump wants control over Greenland (an autonomous territory of Denmark) and demands that Canada become the 51^st state. The White House contends that this is necessary to push back against Russian and Chinese expansion in the Arctic—but of course Greenland, Denmark, and Canada say they would be willing to work with America on these issues as allies. Nonetheless, the president repeated both claims in a recent NBC TV interview.  

So: what can we Europeans do? What would we like, what do we need from the U.S.? And where are our red lines? 

If a Trump-Putin meeting on Ukraine leads to a ceasefire and negotiations: great. Prudence, however, requires planning for a continuation of war while helping Ukraine to change Moscow’s strategic calculus. We assume (I think) that there will be no further U.S. financial assistance, no U.S. security guarantees, and no U.S. support for a European protection force in Ukraine. 

We need the U.S. not to negotiate with Russia without a ceasefire, or to accept conditions that are unacceptable to Ukraine (such as restrictions on the size of its military, de jure recognition of occupied territory, or renouncing NATO membership). And we would ask the U.S. to maintain, better: increase sanctions; to allow Europe to buy American strategic enablers for Ukraine; and perhaps to work with us on the confiscation of Russia’s central bank reserves.  

We Europeans must supply Ukraine with arms (including long-range weapons without use restrictions), and help it produce its own weapons. We must continue EU membership negotiations, and never close the door on NATO membership. The trip to Kyiv by the new “E-4”—French President Emmanuel Macron, U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and German Chancellor Friedrich Merz was welcome signaling, as is the increase in pressure. But now they—we—need to follow up with actions. 

As for NATO: We would like the U.S. to stay, and to commit unambiguously to extended nuclear deterrence. We can live with troop reductions, even large ones; but we need U.S. strategic enablers—key air defense systems like Patriots, stand-off weapons (HIMARS tube artillery and ground-based cruise missiles like Tomahawks), and satellite-based intelligence and dynamic targeting capabilities. We can, I hope, learn to build them; for now, we need to buy them. 

European discussions of a European nuclear deterrent are an unhelpful distraction. We must reorganize our own conventional deterrence and defenses, work with the EU to strengthen and fund our defense industrial base and take on the burden of defending Europe in NATO. Twenty-three of NATO’s 32 member states now spend 2% on defense, up from only six two years ago. We can likely commit to 5%—as the Trump administration is asking—if we can spend part of that on defense-related infrastructure investments. And making it clear to Putin that an attack on NATO Europe would come with unacceptable costs to him can and should also rest on economic deterrence: sanctions (especially on the shadow fleet), a buying stop for Russian fossil fuels, the bank reserves are all in play. 

In other words: deals can be made, and solutions can be found for Ukraine and on NATO. But not on other things.  

Neither the complicated relationship between Greenland and Denmark nor suboptimal Canadian defense spending make President Trump’s Arctic gambit anything other than predatory. We can and should cooperate on maritime security in the North Atlantic and the Arctic—but not if the price is sovereignty. 

And there is the even larger question of global order. It has escaped no-one that President Trump’s strategic advisers are divided on whether America needs to dominate its competitors—or come to an arrangement with them. Some in the MAGAsphere could clearly live quite well with a tripartite hegemony of great powers who divide the globe into spheres of influence. My Brookings colleague Fiona Hill—who gave a memorable Lennart Meri Lecture here in 2023!—has pointed out that Trump’s hemispheric ambitions are being actively encouraged by Putin, who would like nothing more than a Yalta 2.0-style concert. I need not spell out what that would mean for Europe.  

The statement by Putin’s speaker Dmitri Peskov on Wednesday that the reestablishment of U.S.-Russian relations continues, regardless of the outcome of the conflict in Ukraine, is not reassuring. Nor are reports of continuing U.S.-Russian negotiations about future trade and energy deals, including over European pipelines like Nord Stream 2. Europeans cannot accept agreements on Europe and Ukraine concluded between Washington and Moscow. Clarity from the Trump administration on these questions would help us all focus on the truly urgent questions before us both: the future of Ukraine and NATO. 

Geoeconomics 

We knew that President Trump was not a free trader from his first term (nor, for that matter, was Joe Biden), and that he takes a dim view of the European Union. But the events of “Liberation Day” on April 2, when Trump announced his worldwide tariffs, have made it clear that this administration intends to deploy geoeconomic coercion as its main tool of hard power, at a historically unprecedented level of aggressiveness—and not excluding allies. 

The rationale: America, Trump’s economic strategists say, is a victim of the globalization it initiated with the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944, which in turn led to deindustrialization and financialization of the U.S. economy, a massive budget deficit, and high government spending. Their prescription: tariffs must be deployed to force trading partners into allowing a devaluation of the dollar and an exchange of their U.S. Treasuries into (practically interest-free) century bonds; this will enable tax cuts at home. Some, like Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, view the key purpose of tariffs as inducing or shaping certain economic or political decisions by their targets; others, like Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick and indeed the president himself, see them as a means to funnel income into the US budget to make up for said tax cuts. 

An aspect of this strategy that is of keen interest for Europeans is the explicit linkage between security and trade. In Bessent‘s own words: “American security assurances and market access should be linked with commitments from allies to spend more on our collective security and to structure their economies in ways that reduce imbalances over time. Such a linked system of security and economic alliances should be dynamic to incentivize behavior that aligns with American interests.” Translation: you pay for security, we don’t tariff. Although I think the Lutnick version of that might be you pay and we tariff. 

A week into the historic global market turbulence and dollar flight caused by the tariffs, Trump suspended them—partially—for 90 days (until the second week of July). Rolling group negotiations with 18 key countries, six per week, have so far yielded a patchy trade agreement between the US and the UK, and a 90-day reduction of U.S.-China tariffs. In between, Trump’s public musings about firing Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell very nearly set the markets into a tailspin again, until the president retreated. 

Still, the lesson of these past six weeks has been that the Trump administration is laser-focused on using geoeconomic tools to reshape not just its national economy, but its strategic environment. Europe’s current dependency on the U.S. security umbrella and the openness of its economies makes it highly vulnerable to geoeconomic coercion; not least because the administration wants to make Europe pay America for security—and is willing to leverage Europe’s security needs against its economic strengths. 

Again: what can we Europeans do? What would we like, what do we need from the U.S.? And where are our red lines? 

Start with the fact that our economic relationship is very different from our security relationship. The trans-Atlantic economic relationship is the deepest and broadest in the world. In economic and regulatory terms, at least, the U.S. and the EU are peer powers; and we provide each other with significant leverage against far more hostile competitors. Which is why President Trump’s remarks about the “nasty” EU seem so off-base. U.S. actions against the EU and the euro are to some degree acts of self-harm. Nor are America’s allies and competitors responsible for decades of American economic policy decisions. I’m not an economist, but even I know that some of the economic theories of this administration range from the mildly eccentric to the outright bizarre.  

But conversely and for the same reason, Europe has an existential interest in the health of the U.S. economy. And our American friends do have some valid arguments on their side. So we Europeans should reflect on the consequences of our own trade and currency policies. Has the EU levied tariffs on U.S. cars and protected its agricultural markets? Of course. Have our trade surpluses contributed to global imbalances? Have Germany’s trade surpluses created imbalances within the EU? Can we discuss the undervaluation of the Euro? Yes, yes, and yes. 

Ideally, the logic of our interdependence would lead us to greater integration and cooperation: a U.S.-EU free trade(-plus) agreement. Where we are, however, is that EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen responded to the tariffs with an offer to move to “zero-for-zero” tariffs and was rejected by the White House, which instead demanded that Europeans buy $350 billion of fossil fuels (roughly its total annual energy imports) from the U.S. Wisely, Brussels has paused its retaliatory tariffs against Trump’s earlier aluminum and steel tariffs and refrained from escalatory moves of its own pending negotiations. But it is also prepared to ratchet up countertariffs (slow escalation) or to deploy its “anti-coercion instrument” (the nuclear option) should the Trump administration resume its suspended tariff war in early July. 

The European deal on offer now, as explained recently by Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič: if the U.S. accepts that services should be included in the calculation, the EU surplus shrinks to $50 billion; the EU could make up for that with LNG and agricultural purchases. 

Such an agreement would mean we avoid a trade war which will only be exploited by our real adversaries and can focus together on supporting Ukraine against Russia’s continuing aggression. Given the negotiating impasse we are at with the Kremlin, that seems in both our interests. It would also hold out the opportunity for a future joint rebalancing of the trans-Atlantic economic relationship—which the White House’s current coercive framing effectively precludes. 

Democracy 

Disagreements about rights, freedoms, and values have been standard fare for the trans-Atlantic relationship: we’ve had bitter fights over genuinely serious issues, like torture or the death penalty. And yes, our American friends are right if they point out that the prosecution of hate speech in some European countries has produced some silly excesses—guilty as charged. 

But it is something else entirely when our internal democratic orders themselves are targeted by extremists. Separation of powers, representative democracy, political pluralism, rule of law, protection of freedoms and human rights: these principles are the foundation of our domestic constitutions in Europe. They are now under systematic attack. Propaganda, disinformation, corruption, and sabotage are deployed against institutions, parliaments, and courts, political parties, public broadcasting, and media—even against empiricism, reason, and the idea of a socially accepted notion of truth. The extremists manipulate the fear, exhaustion, and anger of voters with false promises of easy solutions. We are watching elections in Romania and Poland this weekend with concern. 

Often, these actors are enabled from outside. Russia’s role in this context is well known. What is new is support from the other side of the Atlantic: from a democracy that turns 250 next year and that for 80 years has stood guard over the safety, prosperity, and democratic transformation of Europe. 

Recall Vice President JD Vance’s speech endorsing the extreme-right AfD in Munich; or Elon Musk’s tirades in support of Nigel Farage’s Reform UK, and his campaigning for the AfD’s leader during the German election. Recently, when the German domestic intelligence service designated the AfD as an extreme-right party, that drew the ire of the vice president, the U.S. secretary of state, his deputy, and (of course) Elon Musk. Even when the vice president switches to persuasion (as in a recent interview with Sohrab Ahmari, or a conversation at a trans-Atlantic leaders’ meeting in Washington) his messaging insistently questions the legitimacy of Europe’s centrist governments and political elites, because—he says—we suppress the free speech of the right.  

But tolerance for freedom of speech must end where that speech is racist, antisemitic, and wants to destroy our democracy. That too, is a legacy of our history. And it is probably our most important red line. It cannot be negotiated. Who crosses it is not our friend. 

Europe’s Danger, Europe’s Hope 

In sum: we are in a moment where the global postwar order, along with its normative foundations, is not only eroding but being actively revised—not only by the rivals and enemies of the West but by the historical protector of this order itself.  

That said, I do not believe that Canada will ever become the 51^st state. Now that the numbing effect of the first weeks of shock and awe appears to be abating, we can see how much incoherence and inconsistency there is; and we see the beginnings of resistance. 

Yet the damage already done is incalculable. The volatility and confusion we are living in is liable to exploitation by adversaries. And there are still tipping point scenarios which could mean catastrophe for Europe: 

• Russian victory in Ukraine 
• a Russian threat, supported by China, against NATO Europe 
• a full-blown trade and currency war that causes a recession, destroys European efforts at rearmament and regaining competitiveness, and fuels hard-right movements 
• right-wing extremists in government in France or Germany 

So—much is at stake. For us in Europe, and surely also for many in America. We Europeans need each other; and certainly in the short term, we need America. The goal, of course, must be to work towards a rebalanced, more coequal relationship, in which Europe takes on full responsibility for itself. 

The work and hardships that lie ahead for us can seem overwhelming. But I have been traveling widely in Europe these past months, and I have noticed not just concern and fear, but empathy and warmth. We see each other not just as Estonians or Germans or Icelanders or Spanish but as Europeans, and there is an understanding that we must rise to the moment. Europe, as the great French philosopher Raymond Aron said, is a “political and moral community”—and for us that is lived, daily experience. So I believe that we will get through this time together. Our Ukrainian neighbors teach us about perseverance every day. And I also believe we will find our American friends again on the other side. 

Speaking of which: there was another recent election. I’m a Protestant myself, but it has been quite an experience to watch a very conservative faith-based organization elect as its global leader a man who is not just American but multilingual, of a mixed racial background, who has lived in South America and in Europe—and has highly informed views on baseball and basketball. Pope Leo XIV’s call for a just peace in Ukraine and his deep compassion for refugees remind us that there are other ways of being American in the world. 

Thank you for your attention—and for the honor of being asked to give the Lennart Meri Lecture.